JUNIOR MILITARY OFFICER RETENTION:

Challenges & Opportunities

POLICY ANALYSIS EXERCISE

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PREPARED FOR:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

How can the military identify and retain a greater percentage of its most talented young officers?

The United States is currently approaching its tenth year of continuous warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan, conflicts that have been labeled by Secretary of Defense Gates as “the captains’ wars.” By all accounts, the military has performed superbly, with much of that success attributable to its junior leadership. Yet even as the military finds itself with the most capable corps of junior officers in its history, it has also found that some of these young leaders are taking their hard-won experience elsewhere. To ensure that it is capable of meeting future threats, the U.S. military must retain its most talented leaders in the service – this is not simply a matter of quantity, but also a question of quality.

Junior Officers in Their Own Words. Amid all the concern for the health of the junior officer corps in recent years, very few have paused to ask the individuals concerned – the former officers themselves. In this report, we survey nearly 250 former junior military officers who left the service between 2001-2010 about their experiences and the reasons driving their decisions to leave. 75% of the officers we spoke to said that this was their first opportunity to provide feedback to the military after leaving the service. By and large, these individuals remain dedicated to public service and proud of their military experiences. Their responses and recommendations were poignant, thoughtful, and constructive; here, we attempt to give them voice.

Fully 80% of our respondents reported that the best officers they knew had left the military before serving a full career. Yet some factors widely portrayed as driving young officers from service were less important to our junior officer cohort than we anticipated. For instance, only 9% of respondents indicated that deployment cycles and operational tempo were their most important reason for leaving. In the same vein, nearly 75% ranked compensation and financial reasons as their least important consideration.

What does matter? Two factors emerged as areas of surprising consensus among former officers: organizational inflexibility, primarily manifested in the personnel system, and a lack of commitment to innovation within the military services.

➢ Organizational Flexibility. The number one reported reason for separation among our
respondents was limited ability to control their own careers. Frustration with a one-size-fits-all system was by far the most common complaint, with emphasis on bureaucratic personnel processes that respondents called “broken,” “archaic,” and “dysfunctional.”

Rate the following factors in terms of their importance in your decision to leave the military.
(Note: question employed forced ranking of the importance of each factor.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Career Control</th>
<th>Quality of Life</th>
<th>Military Bureaucracy</th>
<th>Weak Superiors</th>
<th>Op Tempo</th>
<th>Compensation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most Important</td>
<td>Very Important</td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Less Important</td>
<td>Least Important</td>
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0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Many of the best officers would stay if …

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The military offered better assignments to the best officers.</td>
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<td>The military promoted the best officers more quickly.</td>
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<tr>
<td>There were more options to attend schools for professional development.</td>
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<td>Jobs were assigned through a market mechanism.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pay was based on performance instead of time-in-service.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>They were not obliged to pursue a higher rank.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>They would leave regardless of reforms.</td>
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</table>

What factors would be most important to you in returning to active duty?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most Important</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Less Important</th>
<th>Least Important</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Career opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family concerns and work-life balance</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Opportunity for promotion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Operational and deployment tempo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational opportunities</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Commitment to Innovation. In second place, 41% of respondents ranked frustration with military bureaucracy as the most or a very important factor in their decision to leave. Nearly half felt the military did a poor job at identifying and rewarding traits such as creativity, as opposed to qualities such as endurance or ability to follow orders.

The Active Duty Perspective. Previous surveys of junior officers who have left the military have often been criticized for two reasons: (1) that such individuals are biased against the military (or as one active duty officer put it, “quitters shouldn’t get a vote”); or (2) that all junior officers have complaints, and those who leave are not particularly more discouraged than those who choose to stay. To address these concerns, we additionally surveyed 30 active duty respondents with similar rank and demographic characteristics as a reality check on our results. We refer to this active duty cohort throughout this report to provide a counterpoint for our survey results. Members of our active duty cohort have had successful military careers to date and were generally positive about their military experience – two-thirds intend to stay in the service until eligible for retirement. Nevertheless, they echoed many of the concerns voiced by our target sample.

Recommendations. The U.S. military is among our most effective and respected national institutions – it does many things right. But even great organizations have room for improvement. In this report, we propose some low-cost, high-return reforms with a goal to introduce greater efficiency and flexibility, which in turn may help to retain more of our nation’s most qualified young military leaders. Our recommendations are largely synergistic, and we have grouped them broadly into six categories:

➢ Know who you have. You can only target your best employees for retention if you can identify them. High-performing organizations regularly grade personnel using a wide variety of quantitative and qualitative indicators, with a focus on identifying the top and bottom performers. We recommend that the military update its officer evaluation processes to provide a more rigorous and comprehensive evaluation system.

➢ Reward top performers. Successful organizations integrate evaluation metrics that reflect institutional goals and explicitly reward the individuals who best reflect those values. In the military, a comprehensive rewards system should also include incentives such as new opportunities for assignments outside the military and mentorships with senior officers.

➢ Give your people a say in their own careers. High-performing organizations offer
flexible opportunities for employees to pursue their interests while maintaining a work-life balance. Although there is little to be done about current op tempos, we believe the military should consider a market-based system that better matches available assignments with an officer’s aptitude, interests, and career goals.

➢ Promote innovation. Senior leaders in successful organizations encourage and formalize systems that promote creativity and innovation. In the military, this should be reflected in revised officer evaluation reports that identify not only past performance but future potential in order to create a clearer impression of a military officer’s true aptitude.

➢ Be open to feedback. Studies demonstrate that high-performing organizations seek feedback at all levels, including from those who leave the organization. Junior officers who leave the service should participate in a formalized lessons-learned system that includes exit interviews and aggregates suggestions and recommendations for review by senior officers.

➢ Continue to recruit. Junior officers value their own experiences but see few opportunities for challenge or professional development during the middle portion of their careers. Senior leaders should continue to “recruit” these officers even after commissioning through improved mentorship and by highlighting opportunities for interesting or unique careers.

We do not mean to say here that we have cracked the code on officer attrition – nor do we claim to identify causal relationships between officer concerns and retention. But we do believe we have highlighted areas for the Department of Defense and the military services to scrutinize more closely. In fact, much of what we report is intuitive – arduous deployment timelines, quality of life concerns, ineffective superior officers, and insufficient financial compensation are all reasons why officers claim to leave the service. Yet our most important message is perhaps this: many young officers say they leave simply because they do not believe their skills and talents will continue to be rewarded with increased responsibility and freedom of action as they progress.
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INTRODUCTION

Today’s junior officers represent the future of the institution – among them may be the next Eisenhower, Black Jack Pershing, or Billy Mitchell. At the same time, the Department of Defense is undergoing perhaps its most significant transformation in the history of the modern force. This change, combined with a decade of near-constant use, has given rise to anxiety about retention within the junior officer corps, long a proverbial “canary in a coal mine” for the military’s organizational health. Some theorize that the strain of repeated deployments is causing junior officers to flee the service; others insist that the personnel management and compensation systems are broken; while still others believe that the problem is simply exaggerated. The true impact, if there is one, may not be known for years. Yet as important as the overall attrition statistics are, this ongoing debate misses a more subtle point: it is not simply the quantity but also the quality of the officers retained that matters. Will the Army have its next George Marshall to call upon in a time of national need? The military, like any other institution, must not only be concerned with simply maintaining enough personnel, but also with retaining its best and most talented.

Yet interestingly, amid all the concern for the health of the junior officer corps, very few have paused to ask the individuals concerned – the former officers themselves. We interviewed 242 former military officers drawn from all four services about their experiences in the military and their reasons for leaving. We were surprised to discover that 75% of those we surveyed had no opportunity to provide feedback to the military after separation. What came through loud and clear in their responses was that the loss of junior military talent is not the problem; rather, it is a symptom of larger underlying institutional challenges. In this report, we attempt to place these junior officers’ thoughtful and often thought-provoking observations in the context of the literature on military adaptation, human capital management, and organizational change. We then propose several ways in which the military might adapt to better retain its most talented junior officers in the future.

Throughout this report we refer in particular to challenges faced by the Army, and we wish to make clear that we are not singling out the Army for criticism. Rather, as the largest force and the service at highest risk of retention issues as a result of the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army’s attempts to adapt serve as a useful proxy by which to examine the retention challenges facing all four military services.
The Making of the Junior Officer Corps

Service end-strength requirements are set by Congress and revised annually, to include multiple increases throughout the last decade for both the Army and the Marine Corps.\(^1\) End-strength by rank is also regularly scrutinized by Congress and civilian policymakers; the current numbers for company-grade officers are indicated below:\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Officers</td>
<td>90,795</td>
<td>65,496</td>
<td>52,031</td>
<td>20,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-2</td>
<td>11,304</td>
<td>7,009</td>
<td>6,504</td>
<td>3,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-3</td>
<td>27,585</td>
<td>22,486</td>
<td>16,550</td>
<td>6,225</td>
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<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>17,010</td>
<td>14,625</td>
<td>10,268</td>
<td>3,910</td>
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In 1980, Congress passed the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, which mandated percentage promotion goals for Department of Defense uniformed personnel, in an attempt to centralize and standardize the different methods used by each service to promote officers. In combination with total officer end-strength requirements, DOPMA standards provide a two-part rubric for each service to determine its total officer make-up:

As this chart demonstrates, developing military leaders is a long, arduous, and resource-intensive process. A captain cannot simply be created -- in the military’s rigid hierarchy, all officers begin as lieutenants and must proceed through an “up or out” promotion process. Creating an additional class of majors can take up to 10 years; lieutenant colonels can take close to 20. The military typically accesses officers through three different programs: the service academies, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) at civilian institutions, and Officer Candidate School (OCS). After accession, officers are required to complete active duty service obligation (ADSO) commensurate with their accession route – typically between 3-5
years of service. Historically, many officers leave at the end of the ADSO period. After this point, the military must compete with other potential employers in order to retain young officers.

**Junior Officer Attrition: A Real Problem?**

Secretary Gates has repeatedly referred to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as the “captains’ wars.” In February 2011, he elaborated on this premise in a speech to cadets at West Point:

> “Junior leaders are given extraordinary opportunities to be innovative, take risks, and be responsible and recognized for the consequences.…*They are+ men and women in the prime of their professional lives, who may have been responsible for the lives of scores or hundreds of troops, or millions of dollars in assistance, or engaging in reconciling warring tribes…”

Today’s junior officer corps is under more pressure than ever before. This is most evident in the ground forces, which have borne much of the brunt of recent conflicts. Army officer retention spiked strongly in 2003, but fell in 2004. By 2005, as the first class of post-9/11 post-OIF officers completed their ADSO period, junior officer retention plummeted to near-critical levels.
leaders.” Other reports indicated that more than one-third of West Point’s Class of 2000 left the service as soon as their initial obligation was up. Although this was largely in line with historical Army trends, some began to predict a crisis. By 2007, the Army was predicting a total shortfall of over 3,000 officers, particularly in the crucial senior captain and major range – those who have stayed on past their initial required tour but who are not yet close to retirement. These statistics prompted the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conclude that the Army “faces many retention challenges … and does not have an integrated strategic plan to address its retention shortfalls.”

Although it now appears as if the Army has righted its ship when it comes to retaining the right number of officers, it did so largely by filling shortages via across-the-board promotions to field-grade officer rank. Less than 85% of available billets at those ranks were filled by officers with the requisite rank and time in service – a critical shortfall, by the Army’s own definition: and today’s senior lieutenants and junior captains spend less time than ever before in critical development positions such as company command. Furthermore, the Army does not conduct forced rankings of officers against their peers until they have reached field-grade level, nearly ten years into their service commitment. In short, the Army’s policy ignores a crucial distinction, which is that having the right number of officers is a necessary but not sufficient condition: the quality of officers retained must also be a benchmark for evaluating the impact of any military retention policy. Even as far back as 2007, Secretary Gates identified the critical importance of retention, saying “These men and women need to be retained, and the best and brightest advanced to the point that they can use their experience to shape the institution to which they have given so much.”

More than three years later, it is still not clear that the military services are effectively executing the Secretary’s bidding. Although such conclusions are often hotly disputed, surveys of junior officers continue to suggest that those most capable are leaving the service. For instance, a 2008 survey of 100 active-duty officers indicated that 62% of them thought the ‘best and brightest’ captains were leaving active-duty service. More recently, Tim Kane reported in The Atlantic that “an astonishing 93 percent” of active and recently active junior officers thought that most or all of the best officers were leaving the service before completing their careers. The dispute about who leaves and why rages on largely because the military’s ability to track and target top young officers is limited – there are simply no available objective metrics on what the “best” officers look like.
In recent years, researchers have examined a number of factors that influence attrition. We asked our survey respondents to force rank the issues most important to them – in other words, only one factor could be most important.

Rate the following factors in terms of their importance in your decision to leave the military.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Most Important</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Less Important</th>
<th>Least Important</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Career Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quality of Life</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Bureaucracy</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Weak Superiors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Op Tempo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Compensation</td>
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Based on these results, in this report we consider four factors in detail:

➢ Operational tempo and deployment timelines. In a 2008 survey, almost 40% of officers ranked operational tempo as the most important reason why they would leave service; it was first among all other reasons. In the words of one of our survey respondents, the pace of deployments was simply “exhausting.”

➢ Frustration with military bureaucracy. In another 2010 survey, 82% of respondents agreed that frustration with the bureaucracy was one of their reasons for leaving. In our survey, we found that dissatisfaction with the personnel management system was particularly important in this regard.

➢ Institutional innovation and flexibility. The generation currently working its way through the officer ranks has grown up with vastly expanded notions of information filtering and accessibility. We found that young officers with significant on-the-ground experience were frustrated that their proposals for innovation and change were largely perceived as irrelevant to the institution.

➢ Financial compensation. Financial compensation is among the Department’s most responsive tools for fine-tuning retention incentives, and has been the focus of numerous studies. In recent years, the services have implemented officer retention bonuses in an effort to induce their best officers to stay. However, our results indicate that such incentives have little influence on the officers who took our survey.
Among our active duty survey cohort, quality of life was the most important concern (57.7%), followed by career control (26%) and operational tempo (10%). The active duty sample largely agreed with our target out-of-service sample that compensation (38.5%) and weak superior officers (28%) were less of a problem for today’s officer corps. Additionally, several commented that they chose to stay in the military out of a sense of obligation and duty to country.

Perhaps most importantly for purposes of this analysis, a majority of the active duty cohort disagreed with the statement that junior officers would leave regardless of changes to the personnel system, lending credence to the idea that small improvements can indeed have an outszie impact on the population in question. Specific breakdows of the comparison between active duty and out-of-service samples are contained in Appendix D of this report.

**Who We Surveyed**

To assess the opinions of former military officers, we conducted a cross-sectional survey of 242 junior military officers ranging in rank from O-2 to O-5 and who served between 2001 and 2010. The break-down in ranks and services of respondents is detailed below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank and Service of Survey Respondents.</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
<th>USAF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O-2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-3</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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We discuss the methodological limitations of our survey approach later in this report, so here we simply note that our sample is not entirely representative of the overall population of military officers, or even of former officers. The officers we surveyed were more likely to be white and less likely to be married than the average officer. Our respondents were more likely to have graduated from one of the highly competitive military academies and to report that they graduated in the top quintile of their basic officer training class. They were more likely to have experienced combat, and also more likely to have obtained or are currently obtaining a graduate degree.

We readily acknowledge that in some ways, these demographics bias our results. Yet if these are indicators of talent, then our work is an initial (albeit highly subjective) effort to identify, track, and gather feedback from high-quality officers who recently left the service. While we do not claim to have identified the “best officers,” we do believe our sample
effectively captures the opinions of a large number of talented officers who would have made a positive contribution to the military had they continued to serve.


7 Thom Shanker. “Young Officers Leaving Army at a High Rate.” The New York Times. 10 April 2006. Available at: http://tinyurl.com/4mq5keh. The number of junior officers who left rose from about 6% in 2001 to over 8% in 2006 (the Army expects to commission between 3,000 and 4,000 new officers every year).

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8 The idea that today’s military was at risk reached its peak in 2007, when Colin Powell described the Army as “about broken” while Lawrence Korb told Congress it was “stretched to the breaking point” and General Barry McCaffrey put it in his typically blunt manner, “the U.S. Army is starting to unravel.”

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11 Interview with Major Carl J. Wojtaszek, Assistant Professor of Economics, Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, United States Military Academy. 9 February 2011.

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PART I: AREAS FOR CHANGE
Organizational Flexibility and Innovation
ORGANIZATIONAL FLEXIBILITY AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

“There is no type of human endeavor where it is so important that the leader understands all phases of his job as that of the profession of arms.”

- Major General James Fry

Background

Known as Millennials, the current generation of America’s young workers is self-directed, networked and highly mobile; rather than building a career within one company or organization, they are more likely to view their work life as a progression of discrete and increasingly-challenging jobs. This population seeks rapid career advancement while simultaneously placing a high emphasis on maintaining a meaningful life outside of work. Studies have demonstrated that Millennials are typically less motivated by guarantees of job security, and have less faith in the promise of employer-provided benefits than preceding generations. Recognizing this generational shift, many top corporations are altering employment and retention practices to accommodate the Millennials’ preferences. As a result, today’s “hottest” companies emphasize opportunities for collaboration, embrace technology, highlight mentorship programs, and create chances for employees to engage in personally fulfilling work.

With an average age of 32.2, the majority of our survey respondents fall clearly within the Millennial generation. Personnel management issues were clearly the largest reason why junior officers in our survey claimed they left active-duty service, as almost 57% of respondents said the limited ability to control their own careers was the first- or second-most important reason for leaving. 74% agreed that the military should expand early promotion abilities, and only 23% felt that talented officers were promoted more quickly than below-average officers. Tellingly, our active duty respondents also criticized the personnel system, and only 25% said they believe the military does a good job matching talent to jobs. In fact, when we asked both our out-of-service and active duty cohorts what word or words came to mind when they thought about the personnel system, the answers were resoundingly negative, and sometimes unprintable (see chart, next page).

In its function as an employer, the Department of Defense must compete against private sector corporations in the U.S. labor market for access to the best talent. Yet the military is limited by certain constraints unique to the profession of arms. As large bureaucratic organizations with wide-ranging responsibilities, the services must rely upon rules and
standard operating procedures out of necessity. Furthermore, the deadly nature of the military requires a substantial investment not only in functional combat skills but also in a

What word comes to mind when you think about the military personnel system?

“warrior ethos” developed through years of progressive indoctrination and command responsibility. As a result, while mid-career military officers often have little problem transitioning into middle management in corporate America, the converse is far less true. Options for lateral entry into the military are necessarily limited, and the most critical positions cannot be filled with just-in-time accessions; military officers must be grown from the bottom up.

This system is fundamentally sound – experience at lower ranks should be a requirement for top leadership. Even acknowledging these constraints, however, the military’s programs for personnel tracking, assignment, and promotion are ossified. We believe there are significant dividends to be gained among young officers by incorporating some best practice reforms into the military human capital management system. The Pentagon has struggled for decades with this challenge, producing numerous iterative personnel management strategies and investing significant amounts of money in retention. As just one example, the recent Army Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) policy offered a bonus of up to $35,000 for an additional three years of service. Unfortunately, most compensation-based initiatives are insufficient strategies on their own. The Army’s own survey data showed that many officers who accepted the bonus planned to extend their service independent of the monetary incentive. Without an emphasis on quality of officers retained or on retaining specific skill-sets, the returns on this policy implementation were quite low.
The failures of the personnel system can be roughly divided into two areas of concern. The first is the failure to identify and reward top performers. Pay for performance is considered basic practice in corporate America - but with rare exceptions, a military officer’s rank and paycheck are determined by number of years in service, rather than talent or military occupation. Exacerbating this disparity, President Bush in 2004 waived a legislative requirement for forced-distribution ratings that operated much like an academic curve to identify the best and worst performing officers. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the result has been inflation in officer evaluations. Company-grade officers receive “virtually no performance ranking at all,” and the Army today promotes more than 90% of its officers through the rank of lieutenant colonel. The problems are not limited to ground forces, however – the Air Force promotes more than 90% of its officers to major and more than 75% to lieutenant colonel; the Navy promotes 84% to major and 79% to lieutenant colonel. This occurs despite legislation establishing promotion guidelines as 80% to major, 70% to lieutenant colonel, and 50% to colonel. Although it is impossible to determine whether the quality of these officers is higher or lower than the cadres before them, the perception that officers are promoted regardless of talent and capability is rampant. Or, as one respondent put it, “Anyone can become a Lieutenant Colonel in charge of 800 Soldiers merely by converting oxygen to carbon dioxide for 20 years and being automatically promoted 4 times.”

Average promotion rates of officers by service. DOPMA legislation sets promotion goals as 80% for 0-4, 70% for 0-5, and 50% for 0-6.

If you were the chief of staff for your Service, what would you do to ensure the best and the brightest stay in the service?

“Encourage more active mentoring.”

“Flexible assignments and billets in more desirable locations.”

“Be willing to fire people for poor performance (not just send them to another unit or higher echelon where they will do less work, which actually exacerbates the problem by giving them a more impressive resume).”

“Allow talented officers and soldiers who are happy with their current jobs to remain in those positions.”

“Not have such a rigid career path. We shouldn’t force people to be S-1s or S-4s just because everyone else has followed that path.”

“Allow them to leave for a year or two without being separated. Think of it as a sabbatical.”

“I would institute an accelerated merit promotion system where true achievers could stand out and be rewarded for their intellect and efforts.”

“Allow officers to pursue graduate degrees at the
High promotion rates and a lack of distinction between officers lead to frustration among high-achieving young officers who see little opportunity to distinguish themselves through military service.\textsuperscript{27} 29% of respondents indicated that troubles with superior officers were one of the top two reasons for leaving service. More than 92% of officers disagreed with the statement that the current system does a good job retaining the strongest officers; 89% similarly disagreed that the current system does a good job of weeding out the weakest.

A second but related issue is the failure to allow officers the command time they need to learn effectively, particularly in the ground services. For instance, the Army’s response to a shortfall in captains has been to access additional lieutenants. This action increased raw numbers but also created a series of unintended consequences: increased waiting times for essential schools and training opportunities, more make-work duties, and less time spent in critical early command positions.\textsuperscript{28} As a result, today’s captains have less overall experience, forcing commanders to assign much of the “captain-level” work instead to officers at the rank of major. The result is job dissatisfaction at all levels, as officers complain that the lack of quality developmental experiences leaves them unprepared to lead in full-spectrum operations.\textsuperscript{29} The graph on the following page shows the relationship between increased lieutenant accessions and decreased platoon command time within the Army.
Lastly, all four services largely fail to distinguish between officers with unique skill-sets or who have chosen non-traditional career paths in assignments and performance evaluations. Although certain skills are better suited to specific types of billets, the current officer evaluation system “provides no unique or distinguishing information about its officers,” meaning the military is selecting officers for specific billets nearly blindly, without regard for their unique skills or inclinations. Nearly 83% of our respondents disagreed with the statement that the military does a good job of matching talent to jobs; 70% disagreed with the statement that talented officers received better jobs than average. For example, the Army relies heavily on the Officer Effectiveness Report (OER) – a standardized form that emphasizes command ability – for promotions, despite the fact that only 12% of senior military billets are command positions. As a result, service members with specific technical skills are often underpaid and underutilized in the military – leading many to seek opportunities to use their talents elsewhere.

The military personnel system does a good job of:

- Matching talent to jobs.
- Ensuring talented officers receive better assignments than average.

Strongly Agree  Agree  Disagree  Strongly Disagree
The paramount importance of reforms to the officer personnel system are identified by the following statistics: 22% of those surveyed felt dissatisfied with the billets they were assigned; 64% felt that having assignments more tailored to their personal preferences would have had a significant impact on their decision to leave active duty. The officers we surveyed told us that not only is the personnel system an identified weakness, but that reforms to it would have immediate and significant effects.

Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements.

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<td>100%</td>
<td>I was satisfied with the billets I was assigned.</td>
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The Active Duty Perspective

Our active duty cohort was generally more forgiving of the military services than the out-of-service officers, but also agreed that the military personnel system was in need of reform. In fact, when asked what word or words came to mind when they thought about the military personnel system, the active duty cohort replied with universally (100%) negative terms. Only 18% of active duty respondents believed that the current system does a good job of weeding out the weakest leaders; a similar number believed it does a good job of retaining the best leaders.

Only 25% of active duty respondents believed their service personnel system does a good job of matching talent to jobs, although most said they are personally generally satisfied with the assignments they have received over the course of their careers.

Our active duty cohort diverged most significantly from the out-of-service cohort on the question of whether to expand early promotions. Both groups are relatively split on the question, but the active duty cohort tended to believe that military promotions should not be accelerated, because it takes longer to gain experience to command at a senior level in
the military. Looking forward at their futures, young officers desire faster promotions; looking back on their careers, more senior officers believe the pace was appropriate. As a result, the military should carefully tailor any new initiatives concerning early promotion to ensure that only those capable of such increased responsibility receive it. Specific breakdowns of the comparison between active duty and out-of-service samples are contained in Appendix D.

Summary

More so than any other factor, our officers believed that improvements to the personnel system had the most potential to positively impact retention. As one respondent noted, “Officers are not afforded the opportunity to do jobs they love.” Today’s captains are the generals of the next generation; the inability to weed out the worst leaders and promote the best is a critical vulnerability. Small improvements to the personnel system to better capture and track the performance of officers will, we believe, produce outsize results. Our recommendations for how best to do so are described in greater detail later in this report.

● ● ●

High promotion rates and a lack of distinction between officers lead to frustration among high-achieving young officers who see little opportunity to distinguish themselves through military service.

● ● ●

6. Ibid. 18.
7. Ibid. 25-27.
is in contrast to previous decades, when the rank of major was used as a point to separate talented
officers for continued promotion.

25 “Recent Officer Promotion Rates by Race, Ethnicity, and Gender.” Military Diversity Leadership
Talent.”
Talent.” 6.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid. 9.
Available at: http://tinyurl.com/6dqooey.
ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION AND IMPROVEMENT

“[The future of conflict] is about leaders. We’re going to need people who can think differently.”

- General Raymond Odierno (USA)
  Commander, Joint Forces Command

Background

The academic literature continues to demonstrate that creativity and innovation are essential elements of organizational success in the twenty-first century. Here we consider innovation to mean the introduction of new methods or products and creativity as the ability to conceive of new processes. In other words, the first is the output; the second is the process. They are similar but distinct; the military produces innovative new technologies all the time through established rules and procedures of equipment purchasing. In this sense, then, being innovative does not go far enough – we must include creativity in order to capture the essential element of ‘newness’ in both the approach and solution to a problem. Or, as one expert put it, creativity is “novelty that works.”

Such creativity and innovation are essential to the military’s operations, where conventional wisdom proclaims that “victory goes to the most flexible command structure.” While the American military has historically excelled at creativity and adaptation on the battlefield, it has struggled recently to replicate these results within its institutional framework. Changes in the institution have been precluded by changes in the doctrine – that is, figuring out how to fight has denied leaders the time to figure out how to update and reorganize once the fight is over. Put simply, despite a decade of combat that has challenged the military’s operating procedures, the military services “… have changed almost nothing about the way their promotional systems and their entire bureaucracies operate.”

Currently, there are few formal incentives to be innovative. As one of our respondents put it, “What is most often rewarded is the officer that is not willing to ‘rock the boat.’” Although about half of our respondents thought that their unit commander rewarded their innovative ideas, only 31% thought the military as a whole was committed to innovation; this is in marked contrast to our active duty cohort, where 50% believe the military is committed to innovation. The problem is structural rather than personal – that is, officers who left personally recognized the value of being innovative but were continually frustrated with the institution’s lack of flexibility. As one officer said in the survey, “At the
unit level individuals are identified, assigned, and rewarded effectively to the extent possible. The problem is that big Army is incapable of doing this."

Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements.

Among junior officers the recent experience of the military’s most visible innovators – individuals like H.R. McMaster, John Nagl, and Paul Yingling – are often parsed for meaning and to glean career direction. When McMaster was originally passed over for promotion to general officer, Fred Kaplan wrote, “every officer I spoke with knew about it and had pondered its implications.” Or, as Lieutenant General Barno so bluntly put it, “Bad generals – dumb generals – kill off innovation and risk-taking, poison the well of future talent, and leave a legacy of ‘ducks picking ducks’ in their wake.” Our respondents generally appeared to agree, ranking creativity as the military’s lowest-valued skill out of 10 characteristics, just behind intelligence.

How well does the military do at identifying and rewarding the following professional traits?

Following Orders
Endurance
Military Knowledge
Decision-Making
Tact
Integrity
Practicality
Courage
Intellect
Creativity

Poorly Not Well Neutral Well Very Well
A second issue is a continued lack of broadening experiences. The evidence shows that thinking creatively is helped considerably by exposure to novel concepts and environments. As then-Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling wrote in his scathing critique of the general officer corps, “It is unreasonable to expect that an officer who spends 25 years conforming to institutional expectations will emerge as an innovator in his late 40s.” The current military processes do little to encourage officers to try new experiences. Officers are not permitted to switch back and forth between military specialties. While 37% of officers have graduate degrees, far fewer obtain these degrees through civilian graduate schools while on active duty, despite a growing recognition that such experiences can be valuable at the senior level. Officers often express concern about what the impact of taking a non-traditional assignment, such as serving on a Military Transition or Provincial Reconstruction Team, will do for their career prospects. As a result, some officers leave the service to seek greater diversity of experience elsewhere.

Our respondents reported mixed experiences with superior officers, but agreed that their influence can have an outsized influence on a young officer’s experience – when this relationship works, they reported that it was one of the most rewarding parts of their military experience, but as one young officer told us, “the problem is one bad commander can waste an entire duty station assignment for a junior officer.” Still, the results are not all bad. A majority of respondents were comfortable expressing their career ambitions to senior officers and thought that they took an active interest in their careers; such linkages are important to preventing what one author called “a brewing conflict between the Army’s junior and senior officer corps.” If the military does not maintain the flexibility to bridge the divide between junior and senior leadership, some young officers may choose to leave the military and find a profession where such mentorship does occur.

Innovation and creativity come from being exposed to new experiences and new ideas. Currently, professional military schools are an almost mandatory requirement for promotion, but more than 76% of the officers in our survey believed that the best officers they knew would have stayed in the service if there were a greater variety of educational options, including at civilian institutions; 71% of our active duty cohort agreed. 40% of our respondents believe their current employer does a better job of informing them of opportunities for professional development and promotion than the military did. Such evidence lends support to the premise that much can be done to improve the military’s ability to identify, evaluate, and reward innovation and creativity.
The Active Duty Perspective

The active duty cohort diverged sharply from the out-of-service sample on the question of military innovation and the role for entrepreneurial spirit within the services. Half of the active duty sample said that the military was committed to innovation, and more than two-thirds said their personal entrepreneurial behavior has been rewarded by senior officers.

That being said, active duty officers also rated creativity low on the scale of behaviors that the military rewards – zero believed the military identifies and rewards creativity very well, and only 18% believe it does so well. However, the active duty officers believe the military does reward intellect – 73% say well or very well – which may be a proxy for insightful behavior. Still, as with the out-of-service cohort, the behaviors that scored most highly on the “identify-and-reward” scale included following orders (89%), decision-making (82%), endurance (73%), and military knowledge (70%). Specific breakdowns of the comparison between active duty and out-of-service samples are contained in Appendix D.

Summary

Although the veterans we surveyed did not believe that the military as an institution valued creativity and innovation, they did think that senior officers took an interest in their careers and that their unit commanders valued their innovative ideas. Still, as one of our respondents said, “Some of the best officers are not seen as the best officers because often times these officers go against the grain.” Our survey results provide evidence that the military could do more to formally encourage innovation and creativity in its junior officer corps, and this would increase the likelihood that they continue to serve.

References:

1. Interview with Teresa Amabile, Edsel Bryant Ford Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School. 10 March 2011.
6. Amabile interview, 10 March 2011.
PART II: OTHER ISSUES OF CONCERN

Op Tempo & Compensation
OPERATIONAL TEMPO AND QUALITY OF LIFE

“Trends in retention are what the experts call ‘trailing indicators.’ In other words, the first time you know soldiers or officers might be leaving is when they have gone.”

- Brigadier General Kevin Ryan (USA, Ret.)
  Executive Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

Although the extent to which deployments drive attrition is debated, the increased operational tempo of recent years undoubtedly explains the decision by at least some military officers to leave the service. The current wars place an enormous burden on company-grade leaders, with counterinsurgency doctrine devolving incredible levels of responsibility to the small-unit level. Today’s young officers have endured repeated back-to-back deployments; many have lost friends and colleagues in combat. Time spent at home is no less stressful, as units face high training demands conducted on deployment schedules and at deployment intensity.

Deployment and Attrition

The problem of officer attrition as a result of deployment is not new to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but has gathered top-level attention in recent years. In 2005, the Army’s own internal concerns about losing its “best and brightest” were widely reported when a leaked memo warned of a crisis in junior officer retention. Recent research has attempted to measure the effect of deployment tempo on military personnel, and to quantify its overall impact on retention. Interestingly, although service members continue to rate pace of deployment as a primary reason for intending to leave active duty, their observed behavior, as measured by reenlistment statistics, belies this claim. Nevertheless, the military has invested significant time and effort into determining the impact of deployment on uniformed personnel.

96% of our survey respondents reported deploying during the course of their military career; 81% reported deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan. We asked respondents to identify the word or words that came to mind when they considered their deployment experience. Roughly 57% of those surveyed associated deployment with words with a negative connotation, while 28% reported words with a positive connotation (the remainder recorded value-neutral words, such as “individual augmentee” or “life experience”).
What word or words come to mind when you think about your deployment?

Yet our survey data indicates that, of those individuals who chose to leave active duty, deployment was not the primary driver for leaving. In fact, only 9% rated it as the most important reason; in contrast, 33% said it was less or least important. Our active duty sample generally agreed, with 10% putting it as the first and 25% the second reason why they might leave in the future. We hypothesize that the disparity between the active duty and out-of-service cohorts is related to demographic differences – our active duty cohort was slightly older and more likely to be married, which may explain why deployment had a greater effect on their overall quality of life.

**Deployment Characteristics**

There is evidence to indicate that some amount of deployment experience actually has a *positive* effect on reenlistment. This may be due to the fact that deployment allows service members to use their skills; similar to police officers or firefighters responding to emergency calls, deployments are the proving ground that validates their training. However, the positive effect of deployment diminishes and eventually becomes negative as months deployed increase.

The length and type of deployment play a significant role in its subsequent psychological and emotional impact. A 2000 RAND report distinguished between hostile and non-hostile deployments – perhaps unsurprisingly, while individuals who experienced non-hostile deployments were more likely to reenlist, hostile deployments mitigated this overall positive effect (though did not entirely erase it). Expectation also plays a role. When matched by reality, deployment time had little impact on retention; in contrast, those who spent more time away from home than anticipated were less likely to reenlist. In the
RAND model, military personnel maximize the value of their deployments when they are deployed in hostile situations approximately 22% of the time.

**Utility of Deployment as a Function of Percentage of Total Time Spent Deployed**

With many Army and Marine Corps units operating on nearly 1:1 dwell-time ratio, expected utility is likely much lower. Although Army Chief of Staff General George Casey recently promised Congress to achieve a two-year dwell time by October 2011, the Army remains far from this goal. Furthermore, little is known about the impact of combat on reenlistment over time.

Nearly 50% of our survey sample reported personally engaging in combat. Of this group, less than 7% indicated that deployment strain was their most important reason for leaving. This tends to reinforce the argument that deployment, even with combat, is not a primary driver of attrition among junior officers. Nearly three-fourths of the junior officers we surveyed commissioned during or after 2001, suggesting that not only did they understand they would deploy and see combat, but in fact that was precisely why they joined.

Neither returning to a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio nor shorter deployment levels would have induced most officers in our survey to remain in the service; the same held true among our active duty cohort as well. Such evidence supports other findings in this study – namely, that the officers concerned are less

How would you change the training system?

“Have officers and SNCOs specialize in certain regions of the world in order to become subject matter experts in the history, culture, geo-political dynamics, and languages of that region so as to enable them to operate more effectively over the course of their careers.”

“There was no mechanism in place to capture the everyday tactics and techniques we developed during a long deployment … A two-week turnover was insufficient to capture all nuance of 13 months of combat work. Every time one of my units deployed it was like starting over from scratch.”

“Opportunities to pursue language and other unique skills training without derailing your career.”

“Teach how to think and plan - give open ended field problems. The training I received was great...if that is what my job required. I did not encounter a single mission remotely like my training.”

“Officers should be encouraged to think on their feet and make mistakes. … When a real world scenario occurs, [officers] have little experience in reacting with critical thinking.”

“I actually thought training was very good and I felt very
dissatisfied with rapid deployments and time overseas as they are with other aspects of their service.

Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements.

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

Returning to a 1:2 dwell time ratio would have significantly increased the likelihood of staying on active duty. Shorter deployment length would have had a significant effect on my decision to leave active duty.

Strongly Agree   Agree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree

Training

The combination of repeated deployments and immediate training cycles clearly took a toll on the officers who responded to our survey, a concern that has been echoed by other research, including by the services themselves. In fact, a 2003 Army report warned:

“There is an undisciplined operational pace that affects every facet of Army life. Officers characterize it as too many short-term, back-to-back deployments and exercises. … Excessive operational pace is … detrimental to readiness, leader development, and officer job satisfaction; leads to micromanagement; and is a major reason for attrition among all cohorts.”

Still, our survey data indicated that the military has regained its effectiveness in personnel and unit training despite the rapid pace of deployments. This is no simple feat and should be regarded as an accomplishment – even officers who choose to leave are not doing so because they believe the institution is incapable of accomplishing its mission. Survey respondents indicated satisfaction with military capability at a variety of levels and over various periods – from a single training cycle to the entire post-September 11th era, and from the individual up through deploying-unit levels.
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<tr>
<td>I was personally prepared for my deployment(s).</td>
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<td>My unit was prepared for its deployment(s).</td>
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<td>The officer education system effectively trained me to lead in</td>
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<td>full-spectrum operations.</td>
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Approximately 61% of the officers we surveyed believed the military has adapted well to operational changes stemming from the current wars; slightly more than half thought the military effectively incorporated OIF- or OEF-specific skills into their training. Officers overwhelmingly indicated they were prepared for their deployments. 79% indicated they were personally prepared, and 76% were similarly satisfied with their unit preparation -- these numbers were broadly true for our active duty sample as well. Such a finding only reinforces the reforms needed in areas outside of warfighting capability – the American military remains fully capable of preparing itself for war; it is concerns in other areas that drive officers away.

Quality of Life

An increasing number of officers list family separations as the reason driving their decision to leave active duty in the post-September 11th era. As one of our respondents said, “The military did not prevent me and my wife from having children, but the specter of another deployment looming ahead unknown in the distance definitely gave us pause about starting a family.” Studies conducted over the last decade place the percentage of officers who leave for family reasons between 23% and 48%. DOD senior leadership clearly recognizes the unique strain deployment tempo places on service members with spouses or children. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen regularly speaks with junior officers, while First Lady Michelle Obama has made improving the lives of military families a highlighted initiative, and the Pentagon has taken many concrete steps to alleviate family stress in recent years. These efforts appear to be bearing fruit. For instance, the Army’s most recent family survey indicated that concerns by Army spouses have dropped from
their historical highs – in fact, 57% say they are now “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with the Army way of life.63 (This may be because of the Army’s changes, or simply because dissatisfied families have since left the service and others have realigned their expectations of operational tempo.) Nevertheless, concerns about marital stress remain, as 14% of Army spouses reported marital problems in the last six months, an increase of four percentage points since 2005, and 56% reported using personal counseling during deployments, up from 49% in 2005.64

Although deployments largely did not drive our respondents to leave the military, our survey results do confirm what many civilian and military leaders already know: officers are unhappy with the pace of their deployments. Family and quality of life emerged as one of the three largest issues in our survey – 34% of our respondents said it was their most important reason for leaving. 79% of officers agreed that the demands of a military career made it difficult for them to have the family life they wanted. One commented, “I traded practically everything in my personal life for my military career.” Only 11% of officers believed their quality of life was better in the military than out. One survey respondent even described post-military life as “glorious,” writing, “It has exceeded my expectations.”

Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements.

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<tr>
<td>A military career made it difficult for me to have the kind of family life I would have liked.</td>
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<td>My career did not allow me to maintain the balance I want between work and personal life.</td>
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<td>My quality of life has increased since I left the military.</td>
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Improving quality of life is understandably difficult. For example, one survey respondent told us, “The inability to choose where I lived was most detrimental to my quality of life,” yet military bases are often located in areas isolated from major population and cultural centers for a reason. Likewise, the pace of operations is largely out of the hands of those who serve. Deployment tempo is driven by decisions made by political leaders to enter into conflict, and the decision to go to war is driven by factors which generally overwhelm
concerns about junior officer retention. Civilian policy-makers should understand the effect their decisions have on military personnel, but those effects must be placed within a larger context of national interests.

The Active Duty Perspective

Surprisingly, the out-of-service cohort appeared to be less affected by operational tempo than our active duty respondents, perhaps lending support to the theory that deployment pace is not a primary cause for separation from service. Alternatively, the difference may be explained by the fact that the active duty cohort is slightly older – they have on average four more years in service – and slightly more likely to be married, both of which may play a role when considering the impact of deployments on quality of life. Nearly half of our active duty respondents said that shorter deployments or returning to a 1:2 dwell-time ratio would have a significant impact on their decision to remain on active duty in the future, a significantly higher number than the 28% of veterans who agreed. Family appeared to be the driving concern, with one active duty officer remarking “I feel that in order to assuage any family issues I may face in the future, I’d have to significantly lower my operational tempo.”

The active duty and out-of-service cohorts were largely in agreement when it came to praising the training they had received. Among the active duty officers, 75% believed they were personally prepared for deployment, and 72% believe their unit was also prepared. Specific breakdowns of the comparison between active duty and out-of-service samples are contained in Appendix D.

Summary

Overall, the evidence regarding junior officer retention and pace of deployments indicates that deployment schedules associated with recent conflicts have not had a major impact on retention. Generally speaking, the evidence supports a theory that military officers value the opportunity to use their skills in accomplishing a mission, as they originally anticipated when joining the military. They continue to find excellence throughout the training cycle and express satisfaction with how the military prepares them for war. However, the pace of deployments does have a significant impact on many officers, among both those who leave and those who stay. Returning to a more sustainable deployment pace and continuing to implement the many quality of life programs underway will undoubtedly ease the burden on the military’s junior leadership.
See, for example, Andrew Tilghman Washington Monthly piece.

James Hosek and Francisco Martorell. “How Have Deployments During the War on Terrorism Affected Reenlistment?” RAND National Defense Research Institute. 2009. 14. The Hosek and Martorell study provides among the only publicly-available information on the relationship between deployment and attrition, although it considers only enlisted personnel.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Leo Shane III. “Casey: Two-year dwell time will be reality by October.” Stars and Stripes. 2 March 2011. Available at: http://tinyurl.com/6ey5b25.


Ibid.
COMPENSATION

The “pay gap” between the military and civilian professions has been an area of focus for policymakers in the past. Some officers still leave for purely financial reasons. However, any pay disparity has all but disappeared after new incentives, pay structure updates, and deferred benefits such as the G.I. Bill and retirement plans were updated in the past decade. In recent comprehensive reports on officer pay by the Center for Naval Analysis and the Government Accountability Office, total compensation for officers was estimated to be $50,000 in the first year of service and $140,000 at 20 years. On average, CNA found that officers make $11,500 more than their civilian counterparts when only basic pay is compared; when healthcare, retirement, and tax preferences are included, the premium rises to $24,870 more per year. When measured on basic pay alone, military officers on average fall within the 70th percentile of civilian pay – that is, 70% of comparable civilians make less than they do, while 30% make more. Still, we posited that perhaps the most talented officers look up toward the 90th percentile rather than down at the 50th, especially as they advance in rank and capability. As one respondent put it, “If you are capable, and with the skills given to you by the military, you can expect to garner a lot more in the private sector.”

However, our junior officers clearly indicated that financial compensation was the least significant reason for leaving, with over 73% reporting it was the least important factor and only 3% listing it as the most important reason. Active duty officers gave similar responses. This finding comes despite the fact that our respondents were skewed towards military academies, post-graduate education, and self-reported high basic training performance – all indicators which would point towards a highly-talented survey group.

In a follow-up question designed to test what amount of pay increase would make a difference, most officers reported that it was of so little concern that they would not have reconsidered for any amount of money; the second-largest group demanded a raise of $1,000 or more per month, likely implausible in the current budget environment.

One officer said simply, “This is not a job that you do for the pay.”
What increase in compensation would have eliminated “financial reasons” as a reason to leave?

This was true even when additional benefits such as pensions and health care access were considered. A little more than half of our respondents reported that they included these factors in their evaluation, indicating that most officers were considering the benefits of a military career comprehensively, and not just on basic pay alone.

Of course, the favorable comparison between officer and civilian pay is mitigated somewhat by the unique demands of the military – long hours, frequent moves, and rapid deployment tempo. Last but certainly not least, military officers must confront the likelihood of injury or death in combat, a consideration that is difficult to quantify or monetize. As one officer surveyed bluntly put it, “What salary would you be happy with if I told you to sit in a chair and have me fire rounds into the wall next to your head for 200 days straight?”

Many officers said they would have found it beneficial to reward deployment performance with financial bonuses – a key indication that junior officers remain sensitive to their remuneration levels even as they discount compensation as a reason for staying or leaving.

Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements.

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The military’s healthcare and retirement benefits factor into my concerns about financial compensation.

End-of-deployment bonuses based on performance are an effective way to reward officers.

Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree
The Active Duty Perspective

As might be expected, the active duty cohort placed more emphasis on the comparatively robust military benefits package than did the out-of-service respondents; 78% of active duty respondents said that healthcare and retirement benefits played a significant role in their decision to remain on active duty. Military retirement vests at 20 years, and uniformed personnel understandably place a correspondingly greater emphasis on staying to retirement the closer they get to this mark. However, the active duty officers surveyed continued to insist that compensation was largely a marginal issue. We hypothesize that compensation acts as a background ameliorator. That is, those who choose to stay may do not do so because they perceive the benefits as better, but given that they stay, they value those benefits more. Unfortunately, our survey methods do not allow us to test this supposition statistically.

44% of active duty respondents said that an additional $1,000 or more per month in base pay would significantly impact their future calculations, but 41% also said that financial compensation is not a deciding factor for them. As with non-pay benefits, we believe this is an issue that may only influence the decision to leave in conjunction with other reasons. Concerns about compensation placed the lowest for both active duty and out-of-service respondents when they were forced to rank the issues they cared about most. In short, as one active duty respondent put it succinctly, “Military officers are not underpaid.” Specific breakdowns of the comparison between active duty and out-of-service samples are contained in Appendix D.

Summary

Financial compensation was the least relevant reason for junior officers who participated in our survey to leave the military. This finding comes despite the fact that our respondents were skewed towards indicators that point towards a highly-talented survey group that would expect to be highly rewarded for their performance. As one officer put it simply, “This is not a job you do for the pay.” Nearly three-fourths of our respondents commissioned after September 11th, and their reasons were clearly not financial. Past efforts to maintain compensation at a level equivalent to the private sector seem to have succeeded, as our survey respondents simply did not view increases in compensation as a relevant consideration.

For instance, President Carter set up a Presidential Commission on Military Compensation in 1977, and the Department of Defense continues to track compensation closely. (See: http://militarypay.defense.gov/)


Ibid.

Confidential interview with USMC Major. 24 January 2011.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Any recommendations to improve retention must be considered in the context of two ongoing wars, a continuing economic recession, and forecasted reductions in the Department of Defense budget. With this in mind, we evaluated potential recommendations using the following criteria:

➢ Broad. The Department of Defense is a vast organization, and its programs varied and wide-ranging. Rather than propose specific or limited fixes, we seek instead to articulate general principles for institutional reform.

➢ Flexible. Each service has its own processes for managing personnel and procurement, its own way of fighting wars, and a history and set of traditions that make it unique. Any “one size fits all” recommendation must allow for an appropriate amount of flexibility to adapt to these diverse service-specific cultures.

➢ Measurable. There must be a way to judge the effect of any proposed policy recommendation. The impact of our proposed improvements can be measured using easily available and inexpensive metrics.

➢ Low-Cost. Given the current political, operating and budgetary environment, the need to maximize cost efficiency is paramount. Although we do not create detailed financial models here, we do attempt to propose recommendations that may be implemented at low cost, but which have high returns.

Keeping in mind these criteria, we group our recommendations into the following six broad-based categories:

➢ Know who you have.
➢ Reward your top performers.
➢ Give your people a say in their own careers.
➢ Promote innovation.
➢ Be open to feedback.
➢ Talk to your people.

Know who you have.

The military collects a significant amount of personnel data, and each service administers a relatively robust annual performance evaluation process. However, in recent years the military has largely shed away from assigning a value or ranking for officers. For instance, the Army in 2004 requested and received a waiver to eliminate forced distribution ratings for lieutenants and captains, and neither the Navy nor the Air Force currently requires forced rankings.60
The services’ inability to identify their top and bottom performers makes it much more difficult to tailor personnel policies to retain them. Leading private sector companies invest heavily in developing and refining performance management systems, and we recommend the military do the same. The elements of a successful rating system include:

➢ Guard against inflation. The current officer evaluation system is a cornucopia of different rating systems – for instance, the Air Force and Army only have two categories, while the Marine Corps has eight. To avoid what one expert calls the “B+ Problem” – demoralizing the average performers that an organization needs in order to function – rankings for all four services should focus only on identifying the top and bottom 10%, and group the remaining 80% into a middle bracket. This would allow better clarity in determining who should be transitioned out or offered remedial assistance and who should be offered greater opportunities. The ‘word picture’ is a valuable aspect of the system and should be retained, but focusing on the top and bottom performers would create better assessment of talent and fit well within the constraints of the military’s vast size.

➢ Implement 360-degree performance reviews. Promotion boards should also receive input about officers from their peers and subordinates. We believe a new system that includes such input would provide a more accurate picture of an officer – there is very little one can do to hide bad leadership from subordinates. The process for doing so must be carefully weighed to ensure officers are not punished for leading units through necessary transitions or difficult assignments; some proposed evaluation systems incorporate such necessary safeguards.

➢ Allow for growing pains. Consider beginning forced distribution rankings at the O-2 rank to allow time for young officers to acclimate and adjust to military culture. Additionally, rank not only current performance but also potential to perform in the future, so that even officers who may not have skill-sets well-matched with their current positions are not weeded out unnecessarily.

Reward your top performers.

After identifying the set of officers with the greatest potential, the military must proactively target these individuals. One way of doing so (preferred by the majority of officers we surveyed) is to offer early or “below-the-zone” promotions. If legislative or operational demands make this difficult, the services should consider financial or other incentives to induce talented officers to remain in the service.

➢ Broaden experiences. Consider offering coveted non-monetary incentives, such as preference in choosing future assignments or locations to those who demonstrate exceptional performance and potential. Additional billets outside of DOD –
GENERAL ELECTRIC: A REPUTATION FOR LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT

With nearly 350,000 employees and operations in over 100 countries, General Electric is one of America’s largest and most respected corporations. Under the leadership of Jack Welch and now Jeff Immelt, GE has for decades maintained a reputation as an incubator for talent and management innovation, and a training ground for future CEOs. GE’s leadership development processes are world-renown — in fact, GE develops more talent than it can use, and encourages those not selected for the highest leadership positions within the company to seek out CEO positions with other corporations. Studies have demonstrated that firms who hire senior GE executives, as opposed to CEOs from other organization, are more likely to experience a sustained increase in their stock market valuation.

How does GE continually produce such high-performing corporate executives? It does so via candid and rigorous talent identification mechanisms, and uses this data to reward top performers with increased attention, opportunities, and personalized development plans:

Talent Identification. GE has long promoted intense annual reviews. In an exhaustive process known internally as “Session C,” GE’s main businesses conduct multi-level reviews that begin with the CEO himself and cascade through all 350,000 employees over a period of months. GE’s performance appraisal documents have a forced ranking component, and every employee has the opportunity to personally discuss their placement with a supervisor -- Immelt, the CEO, personally reviews the company’s top 625 executives. By the end, every individual employee exactly where he stands within the corporate structure, and what to do to improve his ranking.

Talent Development. All rising executives at GE have a performance package that follows them and identifies their goals, strengths and weaknesses, and developmental needs. This package, updated annually, is scrutinized closely by senior leadership. The most successful junior executives receive a highly coveted invitation to attend GE’s three-week professional development and training program in Crotonville, NY. At Crotonville, up-and-coming executives are exposed to the organization’s senior leadership as well as top outside executives and business thinkers. In addition to the learning and cross-functional networking that occurs, the signaling effect is tremendous — “being tapped to spend weeks in training at the leafy corporate campus is a sure sign you’re viewed as a potential leader.” Such rewards are also extended to the company’s senior leadership, as well -- every January, the organization’s top officers gather in Boca Raton to plot the upcoming year’s business strategy. BusinessWeek described an invitation to the annual leadership retreat, typically given to the company’s top 500 executives, as “like winning an Olympic medal in GE’s intense locker-room culture.”

2. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
including in think-tanks, other executive branch agencies, or at multilateral institutions –
would allow officers to expand their experiences, learn new techniques, and likely reinforce
their satisfaction with their current careers.

➢ Establish mentorships. Top junior officers could be selected for professional one-
on-one mentorships with high-ranking officers within their own service. The
purpose of these high-to-low linkages would allow information about non-
operational issues to flow more easily in both directions -- senior officers become
more attuned to issues in the officer corps, and junior officers have an opportunity
to learn and be heard. Lastly, such mentorship could leverage these personal
relationships to encourage continued service as junior officers reach critical
decision-points in their military careers. As with 360 evaluations, safeguards would
be necessary to prevent senior officers from hand-picking their preferred
subordinates.

Give your people a say in their own careers.

A desire for greater input into billeting and assignments is a consistent theme that emerged
throughout our survey. The military should consider implementing a market-based system
that matches the supply of officers looking for new jobs with the demand of organizations
and units that need to fill billets. This need not require significant time and personnel; an IT
system can be a key human resources enabler, with some pilot programs already occurring
throughout the military. The key characteristics of such a system should include:

➢ Searchable by applicants. Officers should be able to search open positions by a
range of criteria, including but not limited to: geographic location, unit type, billet
description, minimum and maximum time-in-service and time-in-grade
requirements, and length of assignment.

➢ Searchable by commanders. At the same time, a unit commander with an opening
should be able to search for a specific officer profile using a range of criteria,
including but not limited to: MOS or equivalent, rank, availability, current duty
station, previous assignments, special skills, and Fitness Report “highlights.”

➢ Personalized. Officers should have access only to appropriate job openings. For
instance, an O-3 might be able to view billets at the O-3 and O-4 levels but not
above.

➢ Enhanced connections. Upgrade the matching process to the 21st century by
encouraging commanders and subordinate officers to connect electronically or in
person before assignment and arrival. Consider giving unit commanders the
opportunity to highlight or request specific officers for consideration by the duty
assignment boards. For key positions, allow interviews between commanders and
subordinates before final assignments are made.
Promote innovation.

Under the maxim that what you measure is what you get, the current officer personnel report process fails to adequately incorporate measures of creativity, innovation, and entrepreneurial talent correlated with the services’ strategic goals. A recent internal Army study called the Army OER “an increasingly toothless instrument” that fails to “fully inventory those talents required for success in demanding assignments” and actually “hides talent from the Army.” Personnel reforms that would encourage greater creativity and innovation would incorporate the following principles:

➢ Reduce risk-aversion where appropriate. Identify more clearly areas that must have a zero-defect mentality – ethical decisions, complicated machinery and weaponry – and areas where officers should feel free to try novel approaches even if a current solution already exists. Much like leading-edge technology companies, high-performing officers who request additional time to work on professionally-related individual projects while in non-deployable billets should be given the opportunity to do so.

➢ Enhance the diversity of experiences. Giving high-performing officers the opportunity to attend non-military professional education or attempt non-military foreign policy positions exposes them to best practices and ‘doctrine’ of other organizations that they could then bring back to their own units. Such opportunities might include time at civilian graduate schools, think tanks, multi-lateral organizations, or civilian agencies. This suggestion is related to the much-discussed concept of a Goldwater-Nichols for the interagency in the sense that it would encourage jointness and interoperability outside of the Department of Defense.

➢ No penalty for non-command track. We believe the military should be more flexible in allowing opportunities for officers to pursue their interests. Only 12% of billets at the highest levels are command opportunities; the military should emphasize non-command career tracks that provide needed skill-sets within the services at an equivalent level. Allowing an officer with a unique or specific skill-set the opportunity to succeed in his chosen track without penalty means a greater chance of retaining that officer for when his skills are needed.

Be open to feedback.

Counterintuitively, a continuous relationship begins at the point of separation. In the private sector, exiting employees often serve as sources of referral, financing, and intellectual capital. This is no less true in the military, but 74% of our survey respondents report having minimal contact with the military post-separation beyond obligatory contact information for the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). In failing to seek feedback from the
The nation’s several thousand Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) work closely with their uniformed counterparts and have much in common with the military services. Like military officers, FSOs must be “worldwide available” to deploy in over 265 countries, and Departmental needs are often prioritized above those of the individual officer. Yet FSOs are placed through a unique assignment process that is tasked with matching vacancies to personnel in a manner that is transparent, equitable, and benefits both the receiving post and the individual.

A junior FSO’s first two postings are made via “directed assignment” by the Department – although officers have an opportunity to state a preference, these assignments are largely out of their hands. After the first two tours, however, assignments are organized through a preferential “bidding” process, in which FSOs compete with their peer group for upcoming open assignments via three steps:

➢ The “Bid List”. An annual “bid list” of all available assignments is published and distributed to all FSOs eligible for reassignment in an upcoming year. The bid list includes information such as post location, cone, level, expected start date, and any requisite language or technical skills. Some positions are advertised early to include time for training – for example, an FSO might require 6-12 months of Lithuanian language training before heading to Vilnius. Officers rank their personal preferences based on both professional development needs and personal considerations. For instance, one FSO may be seeking a position with job opportunities for a trailing spouse, whereas another may prioritize language learning.

➢ The “Handshake”. After officers submit their “bids” indicating where they would like to serve (or would be willing to go), the gaining post reviews applications and resumes. At this point, the post may conduct telephone interviews, contact an officer’s current supervisor, or otherwise investigate a prospective applicant. Likewise, FSOs often informally lobby and network to obtain their preferred posting at this time. When the gaining post makes its selection, the chosen applicant is offered an electronic “handshake” – essentially an unofficial agreement between post and officer, approved by the regional or functional Bureau in Washington DC.

➢ The Panel. After an unofficial agreement is recorded, the match is submitted for review by the Department’s Bureau of Human Resources. An officer is “paneled” or officially assigned to a posting only after a review of his record against post requirements by a panel in Washington, DC.

The State Department assignment system is highly competitive and rewards high-performing FSOs who have experience in “hardship” locations or strong recommendations in their current posts. Yet at the same time, officers have access to resources for assistance and support, including career development counselors, and can appeal an unjust decision. Of course, there are drawbacks to any system – FSOs complain about “conal bias” or occasional forced assignment to “hard to fill” postings – but generally, most agree that the system is an efficient way to move individuals around the world on a regular basis.

For information about the open assignment process, see U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 3 Handbook 1 – Personnel Operations (3 FAH-1 H-2420).
population of young officers who choose voluntarily to leave the service, the services are
giving up a vast source of institutional knowledge and information unbiased by command
influence. The military services should institute a more comprehensive exit interview
process with the following characteristics:

➢ Consistency. Exit interviews should be conducted regularly, randomly, and with a
consistent format. They should focus on three aspects of an officer’s career: their
personal experience, their recommendations for how to improve various aspects of
the military, and their reasons for leaving.

➢ Neutrality. For open and honest feedback, exit interviews should be conducted by a
neutral administrator and never by the departing officer’s immediate superior or
any senior officer in that individual’s chain of command.

➢ Confidentiality. Although they are separating from the military, officers may be
reluctant to provide negative feedback about superiors. The military should
emphasize that all information obtained in an exit interview will be treated as
confidential.

➢ Continuous. Data obtained from exit interviews should be aggregated for analysis
at the Personnel- and Service-Chief level on an annual or semi-annual basis and
form a continuous feedback loop. The services should use the information obtained
to identify areas for improvement.

➢ Supported by chain of command. Unit commanders should encourage their
subordinates to be frank and fair in their interviews. The vast majority of our
respondents indicated in some way that they continue to believe deeply in the
military and its positive role in their lives; framing exit interviews as a “lessons-
learned” moment for the military can encourage constructive criticism.

Talk to your people.

Whether or not the perception is worse than the reality, there was a sense among the
junior officers that we interviewed that innovation is not valued or rewarded by the
Department of Defense. DOD is an enormous and complex bureaucracy – 50% larger than
the largest private company in the world64 – and such size requires bureaucratic rules and
standard operating procedures in order to accomplish tasks. However, a continuing and
personalized ‘recruitment’ process for the best officers already in service should be a focus
of the services’ personnel offices. This effort should focus on two key areas:

➢ Highlight interesting careers. Many of the officers we interviewed reported relying
upon gossip about “how bad life is as a major” when considering their next
assignment. The services should implement internal recruiting efforts to
demonstrate unique and interesting career paths. Officers should learn not only
that the generals of the past were able to have interesting and fulfilling careers, but also that their current flag and general officers have led unusual, unique, and fascinating service careers. If the Department does not identify and deliver this positive message, it is all too easy for rumor ungrounded in the facts to take its place.

➢ Be realistic about the downsides. Our officers often saw their command or deployment billets as opportunities to flex their intelligence, will, and creativity in novel environments. They reported that when they return to institutional assignments, they must put this aside and become a cog in the machine. Senior leaders should be realistic about the necessities of working in a large bureaucracy but also reinforce the notion that intelligence, ethical behavior, and a strong will are just as highly valued in a non-deployable billet as they are while in command – and back it up by giving officers the ability to attack old problems in new ways.

Implementation.

Policy analysis literature offers a wide variety of techniques through which the efficacy of a new program may be judged – everything from randomized controlled trials, analysis of historical data trends, comparative studies, and exploiting naturally-occurring experiments.65

We recommend the use of pilot studies as the best method available for testing out new programs. Given the comprehensive impact of many military systems on the lives of service members, randomized controlled trials increase the risk of negative outcomes that would have long-lasting effects on the officer corps. Unlike medicinal trials, where new drugs are often tested on diseases which currently have an inadequate or no cure, new military policies would replace ones that are, for the most part, fairly effective.

Instead of running the risk that forced and randomized inclusion into a new system might have major detrimental effects on the lives of officers, the military should use small pilot studies that rely on officers who feel comfortable volunteering for participation. This will require greater understanding of the demographic and other underlying factors differentiating a pilot study group from the general population, but pilot testing is the best way the military can test out new programs without unnecessarily hurting officers’ careers.

Although financially modeling the effects of our proposed recommendations is beyond the scope of this report, we believe that our recommendations are broad and flexible enough to be implemented at low or neutral cost. Given the size of military programs such as healthcare, capital purchases, and overseas deployments, implementing reforms to the personnel system would have relatively low costs and would likely have very high returns. Many of the recommendations in this section are self-reinforcing – improving
comprehensive rewards will have best effects if those rewards are applied to the right officers, who will be better identified under a new personnel evaluation system. Implementation of these recommendations will be a slow process, but we believe it is absolutely essential that it begin right now, before so much of the experience and wisdom of today’s young leaders are lost.

“...We base this conclusion on an examination of the officer evaluation forms for each service (Air Force Form 707, Navy NAVPERS 1610/2, NAVMC 10835A, Army DA Form 67-9) and from interviews with current active-duty officers, some of whom have worked extensively on personnel issues.

Interview with Cindy Williams, Principal Research Scientist, MIT Security Studies Program. 7 March 2011. One proposed system comes from the Army’s engineer units, which use a platform that shows in greater detail the skill requirements needed for incoming officers – a discussion of it is found within the Strategic Studies Institute’s recent discussion of Army personnel issues. The Navy also runs a limited form of a reverse auction, where the size of the bonus for certain geographical billet locations is determined by how many officers select it as a preference.


Ibid.


METHODOLOGY

Survey Process

We designed our survey questions with input and assistance from many individuals, including Tim Kane, Julie Boatright Wilson, Josh Goodman, Jerry Carter, Victor DiTommaso, and Kate Glynn. The survey was conducted between February 1 – March 1, 2011 using an online survey tool. The survey is available for review at the following location: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/PJXGM9K. A list of survey questions can be found in this report at Appendix C. In recognition of privacy considerations and university standards for research involving human subjects, all respondents were granted anonymity and we avoided any questions and quotations that would cause a respondent’s identity to be compromised.

Methodological Limitations

Although we believe our data will be highly useful for policymakers, we acknowledge the limitations of our results, particularly with regard to sample size and collection methods. Below, we identify some specific concerns that limit the conclusions we are able to draw from our survey data:

➢ Random Selection. Our response generation was a non-random process, due in large part to our inability to access and sample from the entire population of recently-active junior military officers. Instead, we reached out to survey respondents through personal networks, graduate school organizations, ethnically- and geographically-based veterans groups, social networking sites, and ROTC alumni organizations. A list of the organizations we approached to identify potential survey respondents can be found in Appendix B. While we made every attempt to ensure diversity, as a result, the officers we surveyed were on average more highly educated, from higher socioeconomic backgrounds, and higher performers (as self-reported) than the average U.S. military officer. Although this was generally a weakness of the survey, it is also in some ways a strength -- for example, the skew towards combat arms officers with personal combat experience may mean our survey captured personnel most likely at highest risk of leaving as a result of deployment and training stress.

➢ Self-Reporting Bias. All information was self-reported by respondents after leaving the service, meaning that it may be biased by individual perceptions and recollections. Compounding this factor is the lack of objective quality indicators, as we discuss throughout the report – a key example of this is the fact that 71% of our
respondents report graduating in the top quintile from basic training. While it is possible that our sample is indeed more talented than the population of junior officers as a whole (as evidenced by the number of respondents who have since gone on to graduate programs or other comparatively prestigious opportunities), it is equally likely that some of this self-reporting has been inflated. Although we took self-reported data from the officers we surveyed as truthful, further research would be useful to more precisely evaluate officer ability.

➢ External Validity. Our sample is not fully representative of the population of interest. For instance, our data generally underreports the Air Force – Air Force officers make up approximately 25% of the overall military officer population, but only 4% of our sample. Recognizing that the ground forces (Army and Marine Corps) have been more significantly involved in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan than the other services, this may color our survey responses. We additionally lack representation from certain minority groups and individuals commissioned via Officer Candidate School. (A comparison between our sample demographics and the overall military officer population can be found in Appendix A.) Future analysis of our data (or a similar sample) might control for service orientation or demographic characteristics in order to mitigate such biases.

➢ Non-Response Bias. We have no effective way of identifying the population of former officers who received our survey prompt but chose not to respond, nor can we determine their reasons for abstention. If this population differs significantly from our respondent sample, our survey may be vulnerable to non-response bias. Unfortunately, we have no way of profiling the demographics of non-responders. Research indicates that non-response bias is typically associated with lower levels of education; however, given that our population of interest consists entirely of military officers (who by definition have at least a secondary degree) this is unlikely to be driving our non-responders. In our case, we hypothesize that non-response bias may be caused by a variety of factors, such as lack of interest in the subject matter or limited time to respond. This may have impacted our results.

➢ Internal validity. Last but not least, it is important to note that this work is an observational study. We did not conduct a randomized controlled trial that meets the standards of statistical rigor required for quantitatively-based social science research. There could easily have been other reasons why junior officers leave that we did not include in our survey; there could also have been interactions between reasons, or between demographic characteristics, that require more complex statistical analysis to seek out.
Active Duty Survey

The demographic differences between the active duty and out-of-service cohorts are described in more detail in Appendix A. Our active duty sample was relatively small (N=30); as a result, we did not attempt to analyze statistically the differences between the two samples in this survey. Rather, we use the active duty survey as a check on our results, to indicate areas of significant disagreement between the two populations for future thought and analysis. Although the active duty cohort generally substantiated the results obtained in the out-of-service survey, there were some noteworthy areas of disagreement. We did not conduct regressions to determine the statistical significance of these differences because of the small size and non-random make-up of our samples, but this is certainly an area for future research. Having large, randomly-selected samples from each cohort would enable us to determine if a variable was merely correlated or was a causal factor for separation from service. If the officers who stay have very different concerns about their professional life than those who leave, for example, the problem becomes more complex – should the military be focusing on appeasing officers who stay or focus on preventing those who would otherwise leave? We believe the services could accomplish similar analysis themselves, if they undertook a more extensive and rigorous exit interview process.

Other Interviews

We additionally conducted interviews with experts in organizational change, human resources, military history, and bureaucratic management. The table on the following page summarizes these interviews. We thank these individuals for their guidance and advice; all recommendations (and any mistakes contained therein) are our own.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Expert</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linda Bilmes</td>
<td>Daniel Patrick Moynihan Senior Lecturer in Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teresa Amabile</td>
<td>Edsel Bryant Ford Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyndi Williams</td>
<td>Principal Research Scientist, MIT Security Studies Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Scott A. Snook (Ret.)</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer of Business Administration, Harvard Business School</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stephen Rosen</td>
<td>Beton Michael Kaneb Professor of National Security and Military Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Hill</td>
<td>Candidate, Doctor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional Staffer</td>
<td>(anonymous at request of individual)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Carl Wojtaszek</td>
<td>U.S. Army, Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>James Hosek</td>
<td>Senior Economist, RAND</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Kevin Ryan (Ret.)</td>
<td>Executive Director for Research, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LtGen Tad Oelstrom (Ret.)</td>
<td>Director, National Security Program, Harvard Kennedy School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malcolm Sparrow</td>
<td>Professor of the Practice of Public Management, Harvard Kennedy School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Jaron Wharton</td>
<td>Author of CNAS white paper on military retention</td>
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<tr>
<td>Master Chief Steve Haydn</td>
<td>Military Diversity Leadership Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Josh Goodman</td>
<td>Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School</td>
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<tr>
<td>LtCol Jerry Carter</td>
<td>U.S. Marine Corps National Security Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albert Pierce</td>
<td>Director, Institute for National Security Ethics and Leadership, National Defense University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tim Kane</td>
<td>Author of Atlantic Monthly article on military retention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julie Boatwright Wilson</td>
<td>Director, Malcolm Wiener Center for Social Policy, Harvard Kennedy School</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC Timothy Watson</td>
<td>U.S. Army National Security Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School</td>
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<tr>
<td>LtCol Mark Ciero</td>
<td>U.S. Air Force National Security Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andrew Tighman</td>
<td>Director, Army Career and Alumni Program and Transition, Human Resources Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky</td>
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We chose this online system after it was recommended by a number of professors with experience using survey tools. It is additionally used by a range of leading companies and organizations, ranging from Facebook to Lehigh University.
CONCLUSION

"It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things."

-- Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince

The events of September 11 initiated a decade of war in which the military has been hard-pressed to evolve tactics and doctrine to adapt to those of the insurgent groups they have been fighting. Yet the American military has a storied history of reaction and adaption to changing domestic environments, battlefield advances, and foreign policy shifts. From President Truman’s desegregation of the military in 1948, to the post-Vietnam shift to an All-Volunteer Force, to passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, to the Revolution in Military Affairs, the Department of Defense has consistently maintained superior warfighting capability while at the forefront of massive institutional change.

Those changes were not easy; nor will future changes be. Individuals often resist changing existing behavior because they value consistency and economy of effort or because they misunderstand the purpose of change or assess the proposed change as lacking value. Organizations tend to compound that resistance, as members often have a stake in the status quo ante. Organizational change can be expensive and disruptive, and tacit or implicit knowledge is often lost in the process. Change is often hardest at the very moment when the stakes are highest; never is that more true than with the military, where life, death, and the very survival of the state may be on the line. As a result, defense organizations in particular tend to fear uncertainty and resist change – indeed, as Barry Posen suggests, military organizations are likely to innovate only when they have failed or when civilians intervene to force change. Nevertheless, in the words of Harvey Sapolsky, “America’s sustained ability to meet all types of challenges and to generate some surprises of its own was obviously important to its… triumph.” Indeed, few today would dispute that each of the changes we list above improved military cohesiveness, force readiness, and combat capacity over the long term.

The vital importance of leadership and the difficulty of developing junior military leaders underscore the consequences of failing to retain the best company-grade officers. Such a failure is typically most associated with the period following the Vietnam War, but the current era poses its own challenges, as the United States has been at war for the longest period of time since its founding. As a result, failure to appropriately manage today’s junior officer talent may have major implications both for the military’s current operations and its future capabilities.

The value of this report comes only if the military believes the type of individuals who took our survey are worth retaining.

It may be too soon to know just how problematic the current retention trends are, but
there is certainly ample anecdotal evidence for concern. As we have stated repeatedly, however, this concern should not simply be for quantity: the quality of officers retained must also be a benchmark for evaluating the impact of any military retention policy. We have undertaken to examine current policy by interviewing young men and women with experience in the ranks of the post-9/11 military. Many of them are recent graduates or are currently attending graduate schools. Others are pursuing careers as diverse as firefighters, construction managers, shipping experts, and office managers. Still others are unemployed. In all, they represent, we believe, a group of highly-capable officers who have recently left active-duty service. Still, it is important to state clearly what we have done – the value of this report comes only if the military believes the type of individuals who took our survey are worth retaining.

As we have demonstrated here, areas of concern among officers include pace of deployment, inability to start or raise a family, and lack of control over career choices. Some of these factors are largely out of the services’ control, subordinate as they are to civilian policymakers who decide when to go to war and how. However, other factors, including career control and openness to innovation, are areas where the military can certainly make headway, either by itself or in conjunction with legislative leaders. The American military continues to demonstrate its superiority in battle with each passing week; it may very well be that it has all of the talented officers it needs. Yet the demands of the current war are high; young men and women continue to sacrifice their lives on foreign battlefields. These young officers represent both the nation’s newest investment in its own security and the seeds from which will grow our future institutional leaders. If small changes in the institution can lead to better retention of these officers, then we believe such changes should be made – starting now.

---


Kotter and Schlesinger, “Choosing Strategies for Change.”


Barry R. Posen. *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars.* Ithaca: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. 1986. Posen argues that the Prussians in 1806, French in 1940, and Russians in 1941 were defeated because they were attacked during a time of doctrinal transition.

APPENDIX A: SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS

|                          | Out-of-Service Sample | Active Duty Sample | Overall Military Population
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Age:</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>34.3(\pm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Years Served:</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>84%(\pm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Ethnicity:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>76%(\pm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islander</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-2</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-3</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-4</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-5</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioning Source:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>37%(\pm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Academy</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deployment History:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never deployed</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mother's Education Level:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Diploma</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate Degree</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor Degree</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate Degree</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-Military Employment:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Employed</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Sector Civilian</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-Time Student</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Have you ever had an opportunity to provide feedback to the military about your experience?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These means were calculated to include only the military population of officers ranked O-2-O-5.
Where this was not possible, we indicate the included population in a footnote.
*This number is an approximation and includes all ranks (including general and flag officers.)
*Data on overall military population branch, rank, and gender is taken from the Defense Manpower Data Center Personnel Reports. Branch and rank data is from January 2011; gender data is from September 2010.
*Data on overall military population race/ethnicity, marital status, commissioning source, and age is taken from the FY2009 “Population Representation in the Military Services” report, cited previously in this report.
*These statistics represent the mean for all ranks (including general and flag officers.)
AMVETS
American Legion
Air Force Association
Booth Armed Forces Group
Citadel Alumni Association
City College of New York ROTC Alumni Group
Columbia Law School Military Association
Darden Military Alumni
Fisher Veterans Association
Georgetown University Military Association
Haas Veterans Club
Harvard Business School Armed Forces Alumni Association
Harvard Kennedy School Armed Forces Committee
Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America
Johnson School Veterans Group
Kellogg Veterans Association
Kenan-Flagler Veterans Club
Marine Corps Association
Marine Corps League
McCombs Armed Forces Alumni Association
McDonough Military Association
Miami University Naval ROTC Alumni
Military Officers Association of America
Military Order of the Purple Heart
National Association for Black Veterans
Northwestern Law Veterans Association
Norwich University Alumni Association
Penn State Army ROTC Alumni
Ross Armed Forces Association
Sloan Veterans Association
Society of Hispanic Veterans
Stanford GSB and Law Veterans Clubs
Stern Military Veterans Club
Student Veterans Association at Duke University
Tepper Military Veterans Association
Texas A & M Corps of Cadets Alumni Association
Tuck Armed Forces Alumni Association
UCLA Law Veterans Society
USC Veterans Association
Virginia Law Veterans
Virginia Military Institute Alumni Agencies
Virginia Tech Army Alumni
Veterans Campaign
Wharton Veterans Club
West Point Association of Chicago
APPENDIX C: SURVEY STRUCTURE

The following is a complete text of the survey as given to the veteran officers which were
the focus of our study. The questions given to the active-duty sample were slightly altered to make grammatical sense.

The purpose of this survey is to solicit opinions from former military officers like you on a variety of topics.

We are graduate students at the Harvard Kennedy School conducting research on junior officers in the U.S. military for our master’s thesis. You will be asked general questions about your time in the military (including training and deployments), your reasons for leaving the military, as well as some basic demographic questions. Your answers will be kept confidential and will never be used in any way that would identify you – our data is aggregated and we will not quote you by name without your permission.

This interview is voluntary. If we come to any question which you do not want to answer, you may skip it and move on to the next one.

You should only take this survey if you have left active service after 2001.

**General Questions**

1. Please rate the following factors in terms of their importance in your decision to leave the military. (Force ranked; an unchecked row means that you did not consider it a factor at all).

   - Operational and deployment tempo
   - Limited ability to control my own career
   - Family and quality of life concerns
   - Frustration with military bureaucracy
   - Weak superior officers
   - Financial reasons
   - Other reasons (please specify)

2. Many of the best officers who leave the service would stay... (Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree, N/A)

   - if the military offered better assignments to the best officers.
   - if the military promoted the best officers more quickly.
   - if they were not obliged to pursue a higher rank.
   - if the pay was based on performance instead of time-in-service.
   - if jobs were assigned through a market mechanism.
   - if there were more options for schools to attend for professional development.
   - They would leave regardless of reforms to the personnel system.

3. If you were the chief of staff for your Service, what would you do to ensure the best and the brightest stay in the service? (Free response)

4. What factors would be most important to you in determining whether you would consider returning to active service? (Force ranked; an unchecked row means that you did not consider it a factor at all).

   - Operational and deployment tempo
   - Career opportunities
   - Family concerns and work-life balance
   - Opportunity for promotion
   - Financial incentives
   - Educational opportunities
Lack of opportunity in private sector

5. Would you advise your own children to enter the service? Why or why not? (Free response)

Training and Deployment

6. What is the first word or words that come to mind when you think of your deployment(s)? (Free response)

7. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. (Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree, N/A)
   
   • The military has adapted well to changes in the operational environment stemming from the current wars.
   • The military did a good job of incorporating OIF/OEF-specific skills into my training.
   • I was personally prepared for my deployment(s).
   • My unit was prepared for its deployment(s).
   • The officer education system did an effective job of training me to lead my unit in full-spectrum operations.
   • Returning to a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell-time ratio would have significantly increased the likelihood of staying on active duty.
   • Shorter deployment length would have had a significant effect on my decision to leave active duty.

8. If you were the chief of staff of your military service, what changes would you make to the training system? (Free response)

Family and Quality of Life

9. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. (Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree, N/A)
   
   • The demands of a military career made it difficult for me to have the kind of family life I would have liked.
   • A military career did not allow me to maintain the kind of balance I want between my work and personal life.
   • My quality of life has increased since I left the military.

Personnel System

10. What is the first word or words that come to mind when you think about the military's personnel system? (Free response)

11. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. (Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree, N/A)
   
   • The current military personnel system does a good job of weeding out the weakest leaders.
   • The current military personnel system does a good job retaining the best leaders.
   • The rate of military promotions should not be accelerated because it takes longer to gain experience to command at a senior level in the military.
   • The military should expand early promotion opportunities.

   • In general, talented and capable officers advanced more quickly than average or below-average officers.
   • In general, talented and capable officers received better assignments than average or below-average officers.
• The best officers I knew left the military before serving a full career.
• In general, I was satisfied with the rate at which I was promoted.
• In general, I was satisfied with the billets that I was assigned.
• I was informed of the opportunities available to me for my next billet assignment.
• Billet assignments more tailored to my personal preferences would have had a significant impact on my decision to leave active duty.
• The current military personnel system does a good job matching talent to jobs.
• The military should allow former officers to rejoin the service (lateral entry).

Innovation

12. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. (Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree, N/A)

• The military is focused on process more than product.
• Military leaders are willing to ignore conventional wisdom when necessary.
• The military is committed to innovation.
• The military valued my contributions.
• Better use of new technology would have made me more effective at my job.
• Better use of new technology would have made my unit more effective while deployed.

13. If you used social media applications while you were in the military, how often, on average, did you use them? How often did your superior officers use them? Your subordinates? (Once a day, Once a week, Once a month, Less often than once a month, never, N/A)

14. How well does the military do at identifying and rewarding the following personal and professional traits? (Very Well, Well, Neutral, Not Well, Poorly)

• Intellect
• Creativity
• Tact
• Endurance
• Following orders
• Courage
• Integrity
• Practicality
• Military knowledge and education
• Decision-making

Senior Officers

15. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. (Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree, N/A)

• I felt that senior officers took an active interest in my career.
• I was comfortable expressing my career ambitions with my superior officers.
• My commanders rewarded my innovative ideas.
• The military made the best use of my personal talents during my time on active duty.

Compensation

16. The average active-duty Army captain with 4-6 years of service has monthly basic pay of approximately $5,000. What increase in compensation would have eliminated “financial reasons” as a reason to leave active duty? (Multiple choice, single answer)
• Not originally a reason (0%)
• $250 more a month ($3,000 annually)
• $500 more a month ($6,000 annually)
• $1,000 more a month ($12,000 annually)
• More than $1,000 a month

17. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. (Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree, N/A)

• The military's healthcare and non-financial retirement benefits factored into my concerns about financial compensation.
• End-of-deployment bonuses based on deployment performance is an effective way to reward officers.

After Service

18. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. (Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree, N/A)

• My current employer has more flexible personnel and promotion policies than the military.
• My current employer does a better job of evaluating and rewarding talent and potential than the military.
• My current employer does a better job of informing me of educational opportunities for professional development and promotion than the military.

19. What factors would be most important to you in determining whether you would consider returning to active service? (Force ranked; an unchecked row means that you did not consider it a factor at all).

• Operational and deployment tempo
• Career opportunities
• Family concerns and work-life balance
• Opportunity for promotion
• Financial incentives
• Educational opportunities
• Lack of opportunity in private sector

20. Would you advise your own children to enter the service? Why or why not? (Free response)

Demographics

21. In what year were you born? (Drop-down menu)

22. What is your gender? (multiple choice, single answer)

• Male
• Female
• Prefer not to answer/other

23. What is your race/ethnicity? (multiple choice, single answer)

• American Indian or Alaska Native
• Asian
• Black or African American
• Hispanic or Latino
• Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
24. What is your marital status? (multiple choice, single answer)
   - Never married
   - Married
   - Widowed
   - Divorced or Separated
   - Other/Prefer not to answer

25. What was the highest level of education that your mother completed? (multiple choice, single answer)
   - Less than high school
   - High school diploma
   - Some college
   - Associate degree (2 year college)
   - Bachelor degree (4 year college)
   - Graduate or advanced degree

26. In what branch of the armed forces did you serve? (multiple choice, single answer)
   - Coast Guard
   - Marine Corps
   - Navy
   - Army
   - Air Force

27. In what year were you commissioned? (drop-down menu)

28. How were you commissioned? (multiple choice, single answer)
   - Service Academy
   - ROTC
   - Officer Candidate School
   - Other

29. Did you have a combat arms MOS/AFSC/warfare specialty naval designation? (Yes, No)

30. In what quintile did you graduate from basic training? (multiple choice, single answer)
   - Top 20%
   - Second 20%
   - Third 20%
   - Fourth 20%
   - Fifth 20%

31. If you deployed to any of the following locations, please enter the year(s) of your deployment.
    (free response)
   - Iraq
   - Afghanistan
   - Other (please specify)
   - Did not deploy

32. Did you personally engage in combat? (Yes, No)

33. Were you wounded in action? (Yes, No)

34. What was the highest rank you held as an active duty officer? (multiple choice, single answer)
35. In what year did you leave the military? *(drop-down menu)*

36. Since leaving active duty, please check the employment status or statuses you have held.

*(multiple choice, multiple answer)*
- Unemployed
- Self-employed
- Employed as a civilian by the U.S. government
- Employed in the private sector
- On sick, disability, or personal leave from a job
- Full-time student

37. Have you provided feedback to the military regarding your experience since leaving active duty? *(Yes, No)*

38. Is there anything else that you would like to share with us? *(free response)*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOPIC</th>
<th>OOS (N=242)</th>
<th>AD (N=30)</th>
<th>Δ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MORE OF THE BEST YOUNG OFFICERS WOULD STAY IF ...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The military offered better assignments to the best officers.</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The military promoted the best officers more quickly.</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They were not obliged to pursue a higher rank.</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The pay was based on performance instead of time-in-service.</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs were assigned through a market mechanism.</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There were more options to attend schools for professional development.</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They would leave regardless of reforms to the personnel system.</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The military personnel system does a good job of weeding out weak leaders.</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The military personnel system does a good job of retaining the best leaders.</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The military personnel system does a good job of matching talent to jobs.</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talented officers receive better assignments than average.</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was satisfied with the billets that I was assigned.</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The military should expand early promotions.</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rate of military promotions should not be accelerated.</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INNOVATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The military is committed to innovation.</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My commanders reward(ed) my innovative ideas.</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP TEMPO AND QUALITY OF LIFE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returning to 1:2 dwell-time ratio would have a significant impact on my</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>likelihood of staying on active duty.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shorter deployment length would have had a significant effect on my decision to leave active duty.</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was personally prepared for my deployment(s).</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My unit was prepared for its deployment(s).</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The officer education system did an effective job of training me to lead my unit in full-spectrum operations.</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPENSATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The military’s healthcare and non-financial retirement benefits factored into my concerns about financial compensation.</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End-of-deployment bonuses based on deployment performance is an effective way to reward officers.</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX E: SERVICE OFFICER FITNESS REPORTS